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Due to the electronic nature of the procedure, the manuscript and the original figures will only be returned to you on special request. When you return your corrections, please inform us if you would like to have these documents returned. 6 Abstract The examination of a scene of crime provides 7 both an interesting case study and analogy for consider-8 ation of Distributed Cognition. In this paper, Distribution is 9 defined by the number of agents involved in the criminal 10 justice process, and in terms of the relationship between a 11 Crime Scene Examiner and the environment being 12 searched. 13 14 1 Introduction 15 The examination of a crime scene is subject to all manner 16 of legal, ethical and scientific imperatives, and the evidence 17 collected will be subjected to inspection by a variety of 18 individuals with different intentions, skills and knowledge. 19 In this paper, I will suggest that Crime Scene Examination 20 presents an interesting and challenging domain in which to 21 consider the notion of Distributed Cognition for the simple 22 reason that it is not always apparent where the act of 23 'cognition' is situated. The ultimate aim of the criminal 24 justice process, of course, is to acquire evidence which can 25 be combined with information from other sources in order 26 to produce a case that can be tried in Court. Contrary to its 27 representation in popular fiction, the examination of a 28 crime scene is unlikely to yield evidence that immediately 29 links a suspect to a crime. Rather, the collection of evi-30 dence is part of a complex web of investigation that 31 involves many individuals, each considering different 32 forms of information in different ways. Thus, the paper 33 begins with a cursory description of the role of the Crime 34 Scene Examiner (CSE) within the criminal justice process.
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35 The CSE is part of a much larger investigative system, 36 each member of which has their own skills and roles 37 (Smith et al. 2008 ). In a sense, Crime Scene Investigation 38 involves sets of ad-hoc teams pursuing independent goals 39 with quite limited overlap (Smith et al. 2008 ). Thus, there 40 is typically a demarcation between roles. Having said this, 41 the nature of this demarcation has been subject to signifi-42 cant shifting over the years, with the ongoing digitisation 43 of Crime Scene Examination leading to further changes. 44 For example, there used to be a specific role of Crime 45 Scene Photographer whose function was to capture and 46 process images of the crime scene (either prior to evidence 47 recovery or at stages during the recovery process, 48 depending on the nature of the crime). However, with the 49 growing use of digital cameras by CSEs, this role has (in 50 some Police Forces) changed. This has the interesting 51 implication that the function of a photograph taken by the 52 Crime Scene Photographer was to capture the scene as 53 clearly as possible in order to aid discussion of the scene in 54 Court (or during subsequent investigation), but the function 55 of a photograph taken by the CSE could be to illustrate the 56 evidence recovery process; I suggest this because the 57 capturing of images by the CSE is part of the activity being 58 undertaken rather than the sole focus of the activity. 217 about 'water' they would be referring to something dif-218 ferent. This means that the intrinsic characteristics of these 219 two identical individuals would not be sufficient to deter-220 mine the meaning of the word 'water', but that there needs 221 to be some reference to external environment. This leads 222 Putnam (1975) to make the well-known assertion that 223 '' …meanings' just ain't in the head.'' (p. 227).
224 Relating this discussion to the earlier contrast between 225 Sherlock Holmes and contemporary CSE, we could suggest 226 that Holmes represents the application of 'narrow' content; 227 the world and its machinations exist solely through his (or 228 rather, Doyle's) description of them and this description 229 cannot be challenged (simply because the stories rarely 230 include the opportunity to develop alternative explana-231 tions). In contrast, the CSE is involved in the application of 232 'broad' content; the world is represented as evidence which 233 is passed between different people who can offer different 234 interpretations to bear on it. From this perspective, the 235 question becomes a matter of how representations are used 236 rather than a matter of individual interpretation (because 237 these interpretations will always, in an adversarial legal 238 system, be open to dispute).
4 Distributing examination

240
While Sherlock Holmes provides an entertaining version of 241 logical analysis (and serves as a template for contemporary 242 television equivalents), his approach has many differences 243 with modern Crime Scene and Forensic Examination. 244 Obviously, Crime Scene Examiners do not have the benefit 245 of the omniscient author guiding the discovery and inter-246 pretation of evidence, nor do they have the opportunity to 247 present their findings to an informal (usually incredulous) 248 gathering of people, as could Holmes. More importantly, 249 Holmes's form of inductive reasoning requires the proba-250 bilistic elimination of competing hypotheses to explain a 251 well-defined piece of evidence. The notion of a well-252 defined piece of evidence concerns the relationship 253 between recognising something as having potential evi-254 dential value and the interpretation of that evidence in 255 terms of other information. For Holmes (and his modern, 256 fictional counterparts), this all takes place in the head of 257 one person; so the processes are typically assumed to 258 involve the mental states of a single individual. 259 Crime Scene Examination can be considered 'distrib-260 uted', in a trivial sense, in that several people are involved 261 in the interpretation of evidence, each providing a partic-262 ular perspective on this interpretation. What we see in 263 Sherlock Holmes is a literary representation of the many-264 headed being of the criminal justice process in the body of 265 a single individual. As crime scene examination grew 266 increasingly 'scientific' so the division of tasks into
267 discrete specialisms (each with a defined skill set) devel-268 oped (Horswell 2004 ). Thus, it is typical for the Crime 269 Scene Examiner and Forensic Scientist to have followed 270 different career paths and have different skill sets (and, 271 furthermore, for there to be a growing variety of special-272 isms within Forensic Science). Two further factors in the 273 'distribution' of Crime Scene Examination arise from the 274 'civilianisation' of CSE activity (the recruitment of per-275 sonnel to this function from outside the Police Force) and 276 the establishment of specific CSE units (outside the oper-277 ation of separate Police stations). Each of these factors can 278 be related to imperatives of economic and efficiency gains, 279 but they have a bearing on how knowledge of criminal 280 behaviour is shared and applied. For example, an under-281 standing of criminal behaviour, gained over years of 282 policing, could help interpret evidence; but recruiting 283 civilian staff to these posts might remove the opportunity to 284 gain knowledge and experience from policing. This could 285 be dealt with through the training and exposure of new 286 CSE personnel, or through the integration of CSE activity 287 with other police activity. This relates to the second point, 288 namely the removal of a CSE from local police stations to 289 centralised services, which implies the need for a means of 290 sharing experiences and knowledge. Thus, if there is a set 291 of similar cases in an area (say a string of burglaries with 292 similar ways of gaining access to a building), then one 293 would expect a link to be made between them. However, if 294 each case is investigated by different individuals, then it 295 might not always be possible to explore such links.
296
What is happening in Crime Scene Examination is the 297 mediation of cognition through the collection, manipulation 298 and dissemination of a variety of artifacts; each artifact is 299 interpreted in particular ways by the agents who come into 300 contact with it. My argument will be that, for the various 301 agents involved in this evidence chain, each artifact can 302 'afford' a particular set of responses, that is, the artifacts are 303 resources for action, and the actions will be recognised by 304 different agents according to their training and experience. 305 I am using the notion of 'afford' in the sense introduced by 306 Gibson (1977 Gibson ( , 1979 , as a form of perception-action cou-307 pling in which the physical appearance of an object in the 308 world supports particular physical responses (e.g., a pebble 309 'affords' grasping in the hand). Thus, the design of artefacts 310 that are used in a work environment become changed by 311 their use, and these changes provide cues for subsequent 312 use ( . What makes this a challenging domain for dis-314 cussing Distributed Cognition is that the manipulation of an 315 artifact by one agent might have a significant bearing on the 316 state of the artifact, which could interfere with the activity 317 of other agents, e.g., a simple example would be the need to 318 preserve a crime scene so as to protect evidence from 319 contamination conflicting with the need to retrieve specific 340 In studies using ASL MobileEye, a head-mounted eye-341 tracking system, we asked Crime Scene Examiners to 342 inspect a set of staged crime scene. In one study, we 343 compared performance of three experienced Crime Scene 344 Examiners and three Undergraduate students to search the 345 same room under the same conditions. Of the many obvi-346 ous and striking differences between the two sets of 347 recordings, we noted that the students had a tendency to 348 search only around locations that they believed to have 349 links with stolen items-and so their narrative was focused 350 solely on the loss of objects. The Crime Scene Examiners 351 had a far more detailed narrative to guide their search and, 352 as the stills from one recording shown later illustrate, spent 353 a substantial part of their time looking at the door and 354 noting possible evidence that could be recovered, e.g., 355 blood stains near the latch, tool marks made by a chisel on 356 the door frame, a footprint on the outside of the door.
357 Discussion with the Crime Scene Examiners showed 358 how experience played a key role in deciding where to look 359 for evidence and how best to examine the scene. For vol-360 ume crime, the Crime Scene Examiner might walk the 361 scene with the victim in the first instance, and then return to 362 key locations to look for possible evidence. There was 363 some debate as to what should be the first location to 364 search. Standard practice might say that one begins with 365 the Point of Entry and examines that thoroughly. In Fig. 1 
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370 the entrant had cut the right thumb. Comparison between 371 experienced CSEs and the untrained Engineering students 372 with no experience of CSE work showed clear distinctions 373 in search pattern; whereas the students all walked into the 374 room without looking at the door, the CSEs all spent 375 around 20% of their total search time inspecting the door 376 before proceeding to the rest of the room. There are two 377 plausible explanations for this. The first is that this scene 378 (which had been staged to replicate an office break-in) had 379 conspicuous evidence on and around the door. However, 380 this evidence was not so conspicuous that the students 381 noticed it. The second is that the CSEs expect to find 382 evidence at Point of Entry and so attend to this in detail. 383 The CSEs, after the study, stated that this approach was 384 'intuitive' and 'just felt right'. In their discussion of intu-385 ition in problem solving, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) ). In Recognition-Primed Decision-making 393 (RPD), one can infer three broad approaches that the 394 decision-maker might follow; (i) the situation is recognised 395 as 'typical' and an associated set of activities would be 396 brought to mind; (ii) the situation is defined in terms of 397 core features, each of which would be developed in terms 398 of (i); and (iii) the situation is unusual, and the person 399 might mentally explore alternative strategies prior to 400 committing to a set of activities. This study, and discussion 401 with the Crime Scene Examiners, implies that the situation 402 was defined in terms of (ii), and that each aspect would be 403 considered in terms of a set of activities. 424 A second study concerned compared first students on a 425 crime scene examination and forensics degree and experi-426 enced crime scene examiners. In one condition, there was a 427 search of a ransacked office (again the scene was staged).
428 Figure 2 shows a set of stills taken from an experienced 429 Crime Scene Examiner opening the office door and Most of the evidence in the scene could have been used 444 to support the conclusion of an opportunistic crime, which 445 was the conclusion of all five students and two of the CSEs. 446 There were three crucial pieces of evidence which pointed 447 to the alternative conclusion (the shoes, as shown in Fig. 2 ; 448 the fact that the window looked to have been forced but 449 with no obvious evidence of it being used as a point of exit, 450 particularly as it was some 15' off the ground; the order in 451 which the desk drawers had been opened 2 ).
452
The stills in Fig. 2 show an additional aspect of the 453 CSEs exploration of the scene. As well as being guided by 454 their experience of likely places to search for evidence, 455 they need to maintain a running commentary of recovered 456 evidence so as to be able to compare subsequent finds. 457 Interestingly, the two CSEs who did not link the shoes to 458 the footwear mark had previously dismissed the marks as 459 'smudged' and 'not worth recovering'. This implies that 460 the mark was no longer part of their running commentary, 461 and so the potential value of the shoes was not explored. 462 The question of how a 'running commentary' is developed 463 and indexed during a search activity could be worth further 464 investigation. Studies of Distributed Cognition demonstrate 465 ways in which objects-in-the-world structure cognition.
466
Often these objects-in-the-world are purpose-built to sup-467 port specific cognitive activities, or are adapted from 468 existing objects. Researchers would then either focus on 469 the design of such objects, and their ability to support 470 cognition or at ways in which activities result in the 471 modification of objects. Crime Scene Examination repre-472 sents a special case, in that the objects-in-the-world to 473 which the person attends have been neither designed nor 474 adapted to suit a specific cognitive activity. Rather, the 475 objects have to be discovered by the person and then 476 interpreted in terms of their relevance to the task of gath-477 ering evidence. In this manner, the tasks of discovering 478 objects-in-the-world that could have evidential value can 479 be considered a form of recognition-primed decision-480 making.
6 Evidence recovery
482
As mentioned previously, one requirement of Crime Scene 483 Examination is to select items that could be of evidential 484 value. This means not only finding visible items, but also 485 preparing surfaces so that less visible, or latent, items can 486 be revealed. Figure 3 , for instance, shows how a surface 487 can be prepared to lift fingerprints. In this instance, the item 488 being inspected (a glass bottle) is being dusted with alu-489 minium powder using a brush. The brush is applied to the 490 item using a swirling motion to ensure a light, even cov-491 erage. The process involved a period of brushing (for 492 around 10 s), followed by a visual check (for about 5 s in 493 which the bottle was gently rotated to catch light falling on 494 any revealed marks), and then a repeated period of 495 brushing prior to the use of tape to lift the revealed marks 496 (or, more recently, the use of high-resolution digital pho-497 tography to capture the marks) to transport them to the 498 laboratory. In some instances, the visual check might be 499 supplemented through the use of a handtorch which shone 500 orthogonally to the powdered surface. In the inspection 501 shown in Fig. 3 , the torch was not used but the CSE could 502 be seen to be rotating the bottle to catch available light 
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503 during the visual check phase. Concurrent verbal protocol 504 during the search suggested that the CSE initially con-505 centrated on two areas that were anticipated to reveal 506 marks-and there was an assumption that each area would 507 reveal different types of mark. Around the neck of the 508 bottle, the search was initially for marks from fingertips 509 and thumb holding the bottle vertically (as if carrying it) 510 and around the middle of the bottle the search was for 511 marks of the bottle resting across the middle of the fingers 512 and being controlled by the thumb. Thus, a schema of how 513 the bottle could have been used influenced the initial 514 search. 515 While there are procedures in place for the recovery and 516 analysis of finger marks, work by Dror et al. (2005) high-517 lights how their interpretation could be biased with the 518 provision of additional contextual information. In this 519 study, contextual factors were manipulated by the story and 520 photographs that were used to explain the source of the 521 fingerprints, for example crimes with no physical harm to 522 the person versus crimes with extreme physical harm. The 523 study showed that in cases where the fingerprints were 524 unambiguously different, there was little effect of context. 525 When the fingerprints were ambiguous, namely when the 526 certainty as to whether they were the same of different 527 decreased, then the contextual factors seemed to play a role 528 in increasing the likelihood of seeing a match. However, 529 this effect was only observed for the context in which 530 extreme physical harm featured in the background story. 531 The study suggests that in cases where there might be some 532 uncertainty as to whether fingerprints match and where the 533 crime is extreme, that matching might be influenced by 534 context. This also suggests that while the use of a narrative 535 to guide the collection of evidence might be beneficial, it 536 can also bias interpretation and, by implication, search. 537 This raises the potential (and, perhaps, often unexplored) 538 question of how recognition-primed decisions can become 539 biasing rather than supporting, particularly in terms of 540 expectancy bias. This also highlights the importance of 541 maintaining as neutral a description in crime scene reports 542 associated with recovered evidence as possible, and shows 543 why the inductive approach is preferable for the CSE; even 544 if the final 'theory' to which the evidence leads is not 545 developed by the CSE but by other people in the criminal 546 justice process.
7 Evidence Sharing
548
The preceding discussion implies that the search of a scene 549 is guided by experience, expectation and the ability to 550 recognise items of evidential value. In this respect, the 551 notion of Distributed Cognition can be interpreted in terms 552 of the use of objects in the world as resources-for-action. 553 The Crime Scene Examiner recognises objects as resour-554 ces-for-action which may well differ from untrained 555 observers. For example, while the untrained observer might 556 assume that a pane of glass in a window could yield fin-557 germarks, they might be less inclined to immediately 558 assume that it could also yield footwear marks, and still 559 less inclined to recognise its potential for yielding DNA 560 (the latter two could arise from someone climbing in 561 through the window, or from pressing their forehead 562 against the window to see if anyone is at home). 563 So far, this description looks very much like a process 564 that involves the mental states of an individual; the CSE 565 interprets the scene, recognising objects as resources-for-566 action, and then recovers the evidence. However, what 567 makes the Crime Scene Examination process different 568 from a Sherlock Holmes story is that the CSE submits the 569 evidence for interpretation by other people. Indeed, it is 570 unlikely for the CSE's notes and reports from the scene to 571 include any deduction. Rather the report will be as 572 descriptive as possible. This representation, of the scene 573 and its evidence, is passed along the recovery train. So we 574 have a set of processes that could ostensibly represent the 575 stimulus (or input) to a cognitive processing system. This 576 processing is (formally) undertaken by people other than 577 the CSE. 578 Once evidence has been recovered, it is placed in 579 appropriate bags (or containers), labelled and passed on the for bias in the narratives). We propose that each step in the 631 criminal justice process involves the production of narra-632 tive. There are the formal narratives that are structured by 633 the reporting procedures and forms that are used to record 634 investigations and analyses. This would lead to a set of 635 reports, from Crime Scene Examiners and Forensic Sci-636 entists, which are written in a scientific style and which 637 record details in as objective a manner as possible. Such 638 narratives would then be subjected to scrutiny in Court in 639 terms of the methods used to perform the analysis and the 640 interpretation of the results. On the other hand, there are 641 informal narratives that are passed on through discussion 642 with agents involved in the investigation (say, between an 643 attending officer and a victim, or between the attending 644 officer and the crime scene examiner). These tend not to be 645 recorded for several reasons. First, as discussed in the 646 following paragraphs, Laws of Disclosure mean that any-647 thing which has a bearing on the case needs to be available 648 to both Defence and Prosecution so as to maintain fairness 649 and balance. Second, and perhaps more importantly, much 650 of this informal narrative could be said to involve the 651 development of formal narrative, e.g., an experienced 652 attending officer might speak with a victim to calm or 653 reassure them prior to taking a formal statement, and 654 during this process the victim might have several partial 655 accounts of what has happened but be seeking to reconcile 656 this into a single. 657 The final decision of the relevance of an item of evi-658 dence is made in Court during the hearing. However, an 659 initial assessment will be made (in the UK) by the Crown 660 Prosecution Service which will evaluate the evidence that 661 is being presented in support of a case and decide whether 662 it is suitable. This raises one of the key dilemmas in evi-663 dence recovery and relates to the Laws of Disclosure. 664 Basically, these Laws of Disclosure state that anything that 665 has been collected as part of the investigation can be made 666 available to both Prosecution and Defence (even if it is not 667 presented at Court). This raises two issues for this discus-668 sion. First, the adversarial nature of the Justice System (in 669 the UK and many other countries) means that the 'Dis-670 tributed Cognition' involves not only cooperation and 671 collaboration (in terms of several people contributing to a 672 common goal) but also conflict (in terms of two parties 673 attempting to prevent each other from achieving their 674 goal). I am not sure that there are many other areas of 675 distributed cognition research which come up against this 676 problem (although, of course, one can imagine many 677 examples from military and law enforcement). Second, the 678 process often involves a number of different forms of 679 analysis and interpretation. In Baber et al. (2006a, b) , we 680 referred to these forms as formal and informal narratives 681 and suggested that there was a continual development of 682 narratives, along several lines, over the course of an 
